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Abstract 
 
The standard new Keynesian monetary policy problem is, in its original presentation, 
a linear model. As a result, only three possibilities are admissible in terms of long term 
dynamics: the equilibrium may be a stable node, an unstable node or a saddle point. Fixed 
point stability (a stable node) is generally guaranteed only under an active monetary policy 
rule. The benchmark model also considers extremely simple assumptions about 
expectations (perfect foresight is frequently assumed). In this paper, one inquires how a 
change in the way inflation expectations are modelled implies a change in monetary policy 
results when an active Taylor rule is taken. By assuming that inflation expectations are 
constrained by the evolution of the output gap, we radically modify the implications of 
policy intervention: endogenous cycles, of various periodicities, and chaotic motion will be 
observable for reasonable parameter values. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The success of monetary policy intervention in controlling inflation in most of the 
developed world along the past few decades is the result, among other factors, of the 
change in the theoretical paradigm followed in macroeconomic science. Since the 
famous analysis about the inconsistency problem [Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro 
and Gordon (1983)], it is widely accepted that the main goal of monetary policy should 
consist in fighting price instability, rather than worrying about real stabilization. This 
idea became clearer with the development of the model that has gained the central 
position in the explanation of central banks behaviour: the new Keynesian monetary 
policy problem [see, among many others, Goodfriend and King (1997), Clarida, Gali 
and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003)]. 
The benchmark new Keynesian model has been built over the staggered 
pricesetting analysis of Calvo (1983), which has allowed recovering the Phillips curve 
relation. It is admissible to establish a relation between the contemporaneous values of 
the inflation rate and of the output gap, through a parameter that reflects the degree of 
price stickiness; when this relation is augmented by a term that relates the present 
period’s inflation with expectations about future inflation, we can establish the central 
piece of the new monetary policy paradigm, which is the ‘new Keynesian Phillips 
curve’ [this denomination was initially proposed by Roberts (1995)]. 
Alongside with the aggregate supply relation that the Phillips curve defines, 
another state constraint is essential to describe the short run environment in which 
monetary authorities are compelled to take decisions; this is an IS equation that 
describes how the real economic activity responds to changes in the real interest rate. 
With the knowledge of the previous two state equations, the central bank has a 
problem to solve, which is to maintain price stability and, if possible, to guarantee some 
positive difference between effective output and its potential level (if this does not hurt 
the inflation objective). The most immediate solution for this problem would be to 
consider an optimal control setup, under which the central bank minimizes the distance 
between the observed inflation rate and output gap relatively to the target values it 
defines. The constraints of this intertemporal problem are the Phillips curve and the IS 
equations. The control variable is the nominal interest rate, i.e., the monetary authority 
chooses the time path of the interest rate that optimizes its utility function in time. 
If one considers the benchmark version of the optimizing model, a problem arises: 
the optimal interest rate path does not correspond to a stable path, and therefore the 
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intended long term optimal values of inflation and output are not accomplished. In this 
sense, the stability of the equilibrium becomes a central issue in the way monetary 
policy is conducted. If optimal policy is not stable, it is necessary to find a less than 
optimal result that guarantees stability. This is generally assured by assuming an ad-hoc 
interest rate rule instead of following the optimal path. 
The influential work of Taylor (1993) and the huge amount of literature that it has 
originated seems to give a satisfactory answer to the stability concern [see, among 
many others, McCallum and Nelson (1999), Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 
(2001), Svensson and Woodford (2003), Benigno and Woodford (2005)]. It has become 
widely accepted that an active Taylor rule (i.e., a monetary policy rule under which in 
response to an increase in inflation the central bank raises the nominal interest rate by 
more than the increase in inflation), has stabilizing effects. Intuitively, this appears 
correct: inflationary pressures are fought by a monetary policy that triggers an increase 
in the real interest rate, which should have the effect of slowing down aggregate 
demand and, therefore, sustain the rise in the general price level. 
The described monetary policy problem is essentially linear. Replacing in the IS 
curve the nominal interest rate by a rule in which this rate is dependent on inflation 
(and also on the output gap), the reduced form of the problem will be a system of two 
difference equations where, under perfect foresight, the output gap and the inflation rate 
depend linearly on previous period values of these two variables (and, also linearly, on 
eventual stochastic shocks on demand and supply). When changing the linear form of 
the model the stability result can give place to endogenous cycles, which essentially 
mean that a public policy oriented to attain price stability may not achieve a full 
stability result, but it can produce fluctuations, that will be more or less predictable 
depending on the periodicity of those fluctuations. 
Concerning the introduction of nonlinearities, authors follow essentially two 
paths: 
(i) When assuming the optimal problem, the original framework considers a 
quadratic objective function. Various authors, like Cukierman (2000), Ruge-Murcia 
(2002, 2004), Nobay and Peel (2003), Dolado, Pedrero and Ruge-Murcia (2004) and 
Surico (2004), claim that a symmetric objective function does not represent properly 
the true policy problem (authorities do not perceive as equally important positive and 
negative deviations from the target values of inflation and output gap). Thus, in this 
way nonlinearities and the possibility of long term endogenous fluctuations arise in a 
way that is consistent with empirical evidence. 
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(ii) Also consistent with empirical evidence is the fact that the Phillips curve can 
hardly be modelled through a linear relation. Clark, Laxton and Rose (1996), Debelle 
and Laxton (1997), Schalling (1999), Tambakis (1999) and Akerlof, Dickens and Perry 
(2001), among others, present evidence and argue against a linear relation between the 
inflation rate and the output gap, in the short-run. Gomes, Mendes, Mendes and Sousa 
Ramos (2006a) prove that for a specific functional form of a non linear Phillips curve, 
endogenous cycles are found, and this corresponds mainly to cases in which no 
identifiable periodicity is encountered (i.e., when assuming a non linear Phillips curve 
chaotic motion can be generated for values of parameters that do not depart 
significantly from empirical data). 
In this paper, we consider the non optimal monetary policy model (i.e., we 
assume a Taylor rule) and linear Phillips and IS equations that are linear in the relation 
between contemporaneous values. The nonlinearity is introduced by departing from the 
perfect foresight assumption regarding inflation expectations. This is also a subject 
debated in the literature, for instance by Jensen (2005), who considers that policy 
affects expectations about future policy. In Branch and McGough (2006), Gomes 
(2006) and Gomes, Mendes, Mendes and Sousa Ramos (2006b), inflation expectations 
are modified by considering heterogeneous agents, who predict future inflation in 
different ways; under bounded rationality (i.e., under a discrete choice mechanism for 
the switching between expectation rules) chaotic motion is also identified in this case. 
In the present case, we depart from perfect foresight by assuming that agents will 
form expectations about inflation having in consideration the output gap. The rule is as 
follows: when the output gap is equal to its target value, as defined by the central bank 
and perceived by private agents, the perfect foresight will hold; if the output gap rises 
above that benchmark value, then the expected inflation will also rise above the perfect 
foresight value; if the output gap falls below the target, agents will predict an inflation 
value below the perfect foresight value; finally, for strong recessions (output gap 
clearly negative), agents expect inflation to rise faster  (that is, strong recessions will be 
a symptom of an economy where institutions do not work, and therefore the control of 
price stability does not function properly). 
This simple assumption over the original monetary policy problem imposes 
relevant changes on the dynamic behaviour of variables, namely chaos and cycles of 
various periodicities are obtained. Therefore, one concludes that monetary policy 
(under an active interest rate rule) does not yield necessarily a fixed point result, but 
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cycles of several periodicities are observable, when considering parameter values that 
intuitively are reasonable. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
intuition behind the inflation expectations rule; section 3 presents the analytical 
structure of the model; section 4 characterizes global dynamics; in section 5, growth 
issues are addressed; and, finally, section 6 concludes. 
  
2. Inflation Expectations 
 
The simplest approach to modelling expectations consists in assuming perfect 
foresight. Under perfect foresight, agents have a complete knowledge about the 
economy. They know how every other agent will act and how monetary authorities will 
conduct their policy. In turn, authorities should also understand without doubts the 
decisions that the private economy take in every moment of time, being as well able to 
predict and anticipate the decisions of all economic agents. This implies a world where 
agents’ choices become the best response to the choices of third parties. 
This approach to expectations is too narrow, implying full information and full 
efficiency in the use of information. This is why macroeconomics has become 
increasingly concerned with alternative methods of modelling expectations [learning 
mechanisms have been adopted to more realistically describe how agents predict future 
outcomes; see Evans and Honkapohja (2001)]. In the present analysis we ignore any 
kind of learning mechanism and stick with the perfect foresight assumption that gives 
place to the fixed point outcome in the presence of an active monetary policy rule; over 
perfect foresight, one takes an additional assumption that reflects how the private 
economy responds, in terms of the way it perceives price evolution, to fluctuations in 
output. 
We assume that output gap expectations are solely the outcome of a perfect 
foresight evaluation: 11 ++ = ttt xxE . The output gap variable is defined as the difference 
between effective output and potential output (in logs), that is, ttt yyx ˆlnln −= . 
Relatively to the inflation expectations, the perfect foresight prediction is adjusted by a 
term that translates the way individuals think the difference between effective and 
potential output will affect the rise in prices. Thus, we consider )(11 tttt xE ξpipi ⋅= ++ . 
Function )( txξ  must be such that when the output gap is equal to some predefined 
value (that here we consider to be the target value of the central bank for this variable: 
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x
*), the value of this function is 1, that is, perfect foresight holds. When xt>x*, the 
output gap has assumed a value above ‘normal’, and thus agents will suspect that only a 
rise in prices will be able to maintain such abnormally high output gap, and hence they 
will expect prices to rise above the perfect foresight value. If xt<x*, private agents will 
perceive a slowdown of the economic activity, and therefore they introduce a penalty 
term in their predictions, which means that the expected inflation value will remain 
below the benchmark value.  
Finally, when the output gap becomes extremely low relatively to the 
corresponding target value, this will be understood as a serious problem of economic 
malfunctioning, probably associated to an inability of the institutions to fulfil their 
regulatory role, and therefore very low levels (in principle, negative) of the output gap 
will be understood as eventually producing a faster rise in prices because the monetary 
authority becomes unable of controlling the production of money and the interest rates. 
Figure 1 presents the shape of function )( txξ , when this obeys to the 
characteristics described above. Parameter σ>0 is defined in order to present the 
location of the point in which the function reaches a minimum and therefore the 
expected inflation is the lowest relatively to the perfect foresight value. Note, as stated, 
that three areas are identifiable: high inflation is expected in periods of expansion or 
strong recession; moderate recession implies low expected inflation. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Function )( txξ . 
 
½  
1 
xt 
ξ(xt) 
x
* 
x
*
-1/σ 
Etpit+1=pit+1 
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The function in figure 1 can be translated analytically as follows: 
2*
2
* )(
2
)(1)( xxxxx ttt −⋅+−⋅+=
σ
σξ .  
Synthesizing, over the original new Keynesian monetary model one introduces 
only one modification: we bend the line Etpit+1=pit+1 in order to illustrate how 
individuals and firms react (in terms of price evolution predictions) to the output gap 
departures from a reference value. 
Next section incorporates this assumption in the monetary policy framework. 
 
3. The Monetary Policy Model 
 
In what follows we describe the main features of the conventional new Keynesian 
monetary model. The state constraints are, on the demand side, a dynamic IS equation, 
and, as an aggregate supply relation, a new Keynesian Phillips curve. The first relates 
the output gap to the expected real interest rate, 
 
ttttttt gxEEix ++−⋅−= ++ 11 )( piϕ ,  x0 given. (1) 
 
Parameter ϕ>0 is the output gap - interest rate elasticity and variable it defines the 
nominal interest rate. Variable gt corresponds to a demand stochastic component and it 
is defined through an autoregressive Markov process, 
),0(~ˆ ,10 ,ˆ 21 gtttt iidgggg σµµ ≤≤+= − . Subsequently, we ignore the stochastic 
component of the equation in order to highlight the presence of endogenous 
fluctuations. 
On the supply side, the Phillips curve relates contemporaneous inflation to the 
output gap and to the next period inflation expectations, 
 
ttttt uEx +⋅+= +1piβλpi ,  pi0 given. (2) 
 
Parameter λ∈(0,1) defines the degree of price flexibility / stickiness, that is, it is 
an inflation–output elasticity. The higher the value of this parameter the lower will be 
the degree of price stickiness or rigidity. Parameter β<1 is an intertemporal discount 
factor, and variable ut translates a supply stochastic component, that reflects possible 
cost push shocks. As in the demand case, an autoregressive process is assumed: 
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),0(~ˆ ,10 ,ˆ 21 utttt iiduuuu σρρ ≤≤+= − ; also as in the demand case, this term is 
ignored under the discussion of endogenous fluctuations. 
To complete the model, one takes a conventional Taylor rule, which is given by 
the following expression [a similar Taylor rule can be found in Clarida, Gali and Gertler 
(1999)], 
 
txtti xEii ⋅+−⋅+= + γpipiγ pi )( *1*  (3) 
 
In expression (3), i* defines the equilibrium nominal interest rate, pi* is the 
inflation target that the central bank sets (low, but positive in order to guarantee relative 
price variations without the need of nominal decreasing of prices and wages), and γpi and 
γx are the policy parameters that reflect how the central bank reacts in terms of interest 
rate changes, when economic conditions provoke changes in inflation and effective 
output.  
As stated in the introduction, an active interest rate rule is, normally, stabilizing, 
meaning that stability is attained when there is an interest rate response to inflation 
changes that are stronger than a one-to-one change; this implies imposing the constraint 
γpi >1.  
Replacing the Taylor rule (3) in the IS expression (1), and assuming perfect 
foresight for the output gap, we get the following relation between output gap and 
inflation rate, regardless from the expectations about inflation, 
 
[ ] [ ] ttxt xix piβγβλγϕγpiγϕ pipipi ⋅−+⋅⋅−−++−⋅=+ /)1(/)1(1)( **1  (4) 
 
The Phillips curve can be rewritten, having in consideration the way we have 
defined inflation expectations in the previous section, 
 
[ ] [ ])(/)/()(/)/1(1 ttttt xxx ξβλξpiβpi ⋅−⋅=+  (5) 
 
The system one wants to analyze is the difference equations system (4)-(5). This is 
the conventional problem for σ=0, and it departs from this case as we rise the value of 
the parameter (the higher the value of σ, the more the inflation expectations rule ‘bends’ 
relatively to the perfect foresight case). Except in the known particular case, the analysis 
of the steady state and of local dynamics becomes difficult. Solving for the steady state 
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one would obtain multiple equilibria (a third order polynomial would be obtained and 
thus three equilibrium points would arise); nevertheless, the combinations of parameters 
that define the steady state points are cumbersome and it becomes difficult to extract 
some meaningful information from them. Without the steady state values, local dynamic 
analysis is not feasible as well. The next section concentrates on a global analysis of the 
underlying dynamics, which is essentially a numerical and graphical analysis. 
 
4. Global Dynamics 
 
System (4)-(5) involves a linear and a non linear equation. As we will understand 
below, the presence of this nonlinear equation opens the possibility for the finding of 
strange dynamics defining the long term behaviour of endogenous variables. Otherwise 
stated, the following parameter values are considered: β=0.96; γx=0.5; γpi=2.2; σ=25; 
ϕ=0.01; λ=0.75; pi*=0.02; x*=0.03; i*=0.01. Note that for reasonable initial values of 
variables inflation and output gap, we find no limit for the basin of attraction, and 
therefore any value economically meaningful can be considered for the matter at hand. 
We begin by presenting some bifurcation diagrams.1 Figures 2 and 3 display the 
long term possible outcomes of the output gap and the inflation rate for different values 
of the parameter that defines the nature of the monetary policy (γpi<1 respects to a 
passive monetary policy and γpi>1 to an active policy). The most striking and important 
evidence in this figures is that instability prevails for a passive interest rate rule, that is, 
when the central bank responds to the rise of inflation with a less than one-to-one 
variation in the nominal interest rate. Instability is characterized in this case by a 
divergence of the output gap to infinity and of the inflation rate to zero. When the policy 
parameter assumes a value higher than one, the modified nonlinear expectations model 
implies the presence of cycles of multiple orders until an extremely high value of the 
parameter is attained.  
Basically, we note that some regions in figures 2 and 3 define cases in which low 
periodicity cycles exist, while in other areas of the graphics it is evident the presence of 
chaos: the variable can assume practically any value on a given interval.  
We will highlight further the presence of endogenous fluctuations in the figures 
that follow; nevertheless just by looking to the bifurcation diagrams (that are drawn for 
                                                
1
 The various figures presented in this section are drawn using IDMC software (interactive Dynamical 
Model Calculator). This is a free software program available at www.dss.uniud.it/nonlinear, and 
copyright of Marji Lines and Alfredo Medio. 
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the 1,000 observations after the first 1,000 transient ones) it is evident that a-periodicity 
arises. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Bifurcation Diagram (γpi,xt).  
 
 
Figure 3 – Bifurcation Diagram (γpi,pit). 
 
To explore further the dynamics of the modified expectations monetary policy 
problem, other bifurcation diagrams are drawn (figures 4 to 7). Both for the parameter 
attached to the inflation expectation rule and for the price stickiness parameter it is clear 
the presence of cycles and chaotic motion. Note, more precisely, that the degree of 
chaoticity is higher for a low value of σ, and that for λ chaos is present for almost every 
possible value of this price stickiness parameter. 
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Figure 4 – Bifurcation Diagram (σ,xt). 
 
Figure 5 – Bifurcation Diagram (σ,pit). 
 
Figure 6 – Bifurcation Diagram (λ,xt).  
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Figure 7 – Bifurcation Diagram (λ,pit). 
 
One can explore as well the presence of cycles of different orders in the space of 
parameters. With figures 8 to 10, we are able to observe that all sorts of periodicities are 
obtainable for different values of parameters. Regions in white contain the possibility of 
chaotic motion. These figures reveal that the dynamic system is deeply sensitive to 
small changes in almost all parameter values. Recall that instability is ruled out when an 
active interest rate rule is assumed, but for high values of γpi (above 4 – 4.5) cyclical 
motion arises (note that the fixed point stability result that characterizes the linear model 
only arises for extremely high levels of σ).  
In what concerns the relation between the interest elasticity and the price 
stickiness parameter, figure 9 reveals that although we have chosen to work with a low 
value of the interest elasticity, the same kind of dynamic behaviour is observable for 
higher values of this parameter, while changes in λ tend to modify the periodicity of 
cycles but they continue to be present. Finally, the relation between the discount factor 
and the target value for the output gap is also capable of generating cycles of multiple 
orders. The figure is presented for a discount factor higher than 0.5, because for lower 
values it begins to appear a wide region of instability; relatively to the output gap target, 
this apparently reveals a symmetric behaviour for values above and below 0.04 (more or 
less). 
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Figure 8 – Cycles in the space of parameters (γpi,σ). 
 
Figure 9 – Cycles in the space of parameters (λ,ϕ). 
 
Figure 10 – Cycles in the space of parameters (β,x*). 
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We now take the set of parameter values defined in the beginning of this section to 
present some attractors, i.e., the long term relation between our two endogenous 
variables. Figure 11 considers precisely the initial set of values. To understand how the 
dynamics can be modified, we vary some of the parameter values to present the 
graphics in figures 12 to 15. All the attractors are drawn with 100,000 iterations after 
excluding the first 1,000 transients. 
 
 
Figure 11 – Attractor (xt,pit). 
 
Figure 12 – Attractor (xt,pit), γpi=4.2. 
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Figure 13 – Attractor (xt,pit), σ=5. 
 
Figure 14 – Attractor (xt,pit), λ=0.96. 
 
Figure 15 – Attractor (xt,pit), β=0.7. 
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Finally, two pairs of long term time series are presented, in order to illustrate the 
existence of endogenous cycles. Note that both variables can assume positive and 
negative values, that is, periods of inflation and deflation are observed, as well as 
periods when the effective output is above or below the potential level (figures 16 to 
19). 
  
 
Figure 16 – Time series xt. 
 
Figure 17 –Time series pit. 
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Figure 18 – Time series xt, γpi=4.2. 
 
Figure 19 – Time series pit, γpi=4.2. 
 
5. Growth Implications 
 
Monetary policy analysis is undertaken through two state equations that define 
short-run economic conditions. These can be integrated with a long term growth 
analysis. Growth models are generally developed under a competitive framework and 
they are specially designed to analyze the trend of growth, i.e., they are built in order to 
characterize potential output motion. Consider a capital accumulation equation  
 
given     ,)1( 01 kkcAkk tttt ⋅−+−=+ δα  (6) 
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In this equation, kt and ct represent, respectively, per capita physical capital and 
consumption. Parameter A>0 is a technological index, 0<α<1 and δ defines a positive 
depreciation rate. From growth literature it is well known that, given a representative 
agent that maximizes an intertemporal flow of consumption utility functions, the growth 
problem is reduced to a two equations system describing the motion in time of the 
consumption and the capital variable. Then, the long term behaviour of output can be 
withdrawn from the production function, once we know how the rule of capital 
accumulation and the optimization behaviour of the representative consumer imply a 
given path for the capital stock.  
Therefore, we can use the growth problem to get to the potential level of output, 
α
tt Aky =ˆ . In the real world, we are not concerned with how much it is possible to 
produce, but how much it is effectively produced. Given the proposed notion of output 
gap, effective output comes: txtt eyy ⋅= ˆ . In terms of growth rates, 
1
ˆ
ˆ
1
1
11
−
⋅
⋅
=−
+
++
t
t
x
t
x
t
t
t
ey
ey
y
y
. 
If the competitive growth model is stable, and neoclassical features define it (i.e., 
output does not grow in the steady state due to endogenous forces) this means that in the 
long run we find a fixed point stable result for the potential output, and thus tt yy ˆˆ 1 =+ ; 
the growth rate of effective output becomes, then, 11
1
1
−=−
+
+
t
t
x
x
t
t
e
e
y
y
, that is, the growth 
rate of effective output depends solely on the growth rate of the output gap. If, instead 
of neoclassical growth, we take the assumption that the growth model is endogenous (a 
positive constant growth rate defines the steady state), then potential output grows at a 
given rate γ, meaning that tt yy ˆ)1(ˆ 1 ⋅+=+ γ . Also in the case of endogenous growth, one 
can present effective output growth as a function of the output gap, as follows: 
1)1(1
1
1
−
⋅+
=−
+
+
t
t
x
x
t
t
e
e
y
y γ
. 
The previous reasoning intends to conciliate growth analysis, that under market 
clearing conditions clearly aims at explaining growth tendencies, with the short run 
analysis provided by the monetary policy problem: because nominal and real economic 
conditions are jointly determined in the short term, and since expectations are not 
necessarily the simple result of a perfect foresight evaluation, then fluctuations can be 
explained in this policy framework and later added to the growth setup. In this way, we 
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strongly emphasize the idea that business cycles are a short run phenomenon that 
influences the shape of effective growth in time. 
To finish, we present a simple graphical example, taking the benchmark numerical 
values of the previous section. For those values, one has concluded that endogenous 
irregular cycles were present. Now, consider that the potential growth rate (derived from 
a growth / capital accumulation setup) is, e.g., 3% (γ=0.03). Using the definition of 
effective output derived above, and taking the time series of the output gap in figure 16, 
we display in figure 20 the long term time series of the effective output variable: the 
variable gravitates around the potential value, but since the output gap is not constant, 
then effective output is subject to endogenous fluctuations.  
 
 
Figure 20 – Time series of the growth rate of the effective output (γ=0.03). 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The new Keynesian monetary policy model has two fundamental features: it 
establishes aggregate demand and aggregate supply relations that are dynamic and 
subject to the influence of expectations about next period values for real and nominal 
variables (these relations are derived from well structured micro foundations); and it 
introduces the relevant role of authorities in choosing the path of the nominal interest 
rate that best serves the purpose of guaranteeing price stability. It is important to keep in 
mind that price stability is not necessarily guaranteed by solving an intertemporal 
optimal control problem, because this can guarantee a steady state that is close to the 
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target defined by the central bank, but that can eventually never be reached given the 
stability properties of the underlying difference equations system. 
Therefore, the model under consideration constitutes not only a good description 
of private economic behaviour in the short run, but it is also a relevant tool for policy 
analysis and intervention. The model can be presented in multiple forms, and slightly 
modified in many ways. Recent literature has proved that slight changes in the 
benchmark presentation can lead to significant changes in the underlying dynamics, 
what modifies as well the policy implications one is able to withdraw. In the present 
paper we have tried to include an additional change relatively to the original model – 
the idea was essentially to assume that agents do not forecast inflation in a perfect way; 
even if they possess all the necessary information to decide, they will adjust 
expectations about inflation to the moment of the business cycle we are in: periods of 
expansion are understood as periods where inflation will rise faster, while moderate 
periods of recession imply a feeling that inflation will fall. 
This change in the model’s structure introduces significant changes into the 
dynamics. The model gains a non linear character, and as a result we find cycles and 
chaos for different values of parameters, that replace the unique fixed point result that 
the original model is able to reproduce. The implications are many: first, monetary 
policy, that is, the choice of a nominal interest rate rule, no longer gives a long term 
absolutely predictable outcome; second, price stability will depend on the degree in 
which private agents are influenced by output gap changes when formulating 
expectations; third, it is the short run relation between nominal and real variables that 
induces cycles and not the process of capital accumulation, from which one can only 
withdraw a constant trend of growth. 
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